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Luc Boltanski: 
His Life and Work – An Overview1 
 
Simon Susen 
 
Biographical Facts 
Luc Boltanski is widely regarded as one of the most influential French 
sociologists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. He is one of 
the leading figures of the ‘pragmatic’ tradition within contemporary social and 
political thought. More specifically, he is – along with Laurent Thévenot – one 
of the founding figures of an approach that he himself characterizes as the 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. 
Boltanski was born in 1940. He is the brother of the artist Christian 
Boltanski and of the linguist Jean-Élie Boltanski. He studied social sciences 
at the University of Paris, La Sorbonne, and completed his Thèse de troisième 
cycle in 1968. This dissertation – entitled Prime éducation et morale de classe – was 
supervised by Raymond Aron; it was published by Mouton Publishing 
Company (152 pp.) in 1969 and subsequently translated into Italian (Guaraldi) 
and Spanish (Laia). Boltanski was awarded his Doctorat d’État in 1981 for his 
thesis entitled Les cadres : La formation d’un groupe social; this study, completed 
under the supervision of Pierre Ansart, was published by Éditions de Minuit 
(523 pp.) in 1982. 
Throughout his career as a professional academic, Boltanski has been 
based at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, 
France. At the EHESS, he has held three major academic positions: Chef de 
travaux (1965–69), Maître de conférences (1970–81), and Directeur d’études 
(since 1982). 
Between 1965 and 1984, he was a member of the Centre de Sociologie 
Européenne (EHESS/CNRS), directed by Pierre Bourdieu. In 1985, he co-
founded – together with Laurent Thévenot – the Groupe de Sociologie 
Politique et Morale (GSPM, EHESS/CNRS), of which he was the Director 
  
 
between 1985 and 1992. At the GSPM, he carried out several research projects 
and led numerous research programmes until its closure in 2013. He has been 
a Visiting Professor at various universities, both in Europe and in the United 
States, and he was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton 
University during the academic year 1991–92. Currently, he is a member of 
the Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur les Enjeux Sociaux (Sciences 
Sociales, Politique, Santé) (IRIS, EHESS). 
In the early 1970s, Boltanski was involved in launching the journal Actes de 
la recherche en sciences sociales, when his research was still profoundly influenced by 
the works of his academic mentor, Pierre Bourdieu. In the mid-1980s, however, 
Boltanski dissociated himself from Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ in order to 
create his own research programme, commonly described as the ‘sociology of 
critique’ or, more recently, as the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. 
Between 1965 and 1982, Boltanski’s key research interests were directed 
towards the sociology of social classes and social stratification (mainly within the 
following areas: bodily and medical practices, education, social classifications, 
and moral norms). Between 1983 and 2009, his sociological investigations were 
concerned, primarily, with two areas of interest: first, different notions of justice, 
particularly in relation to disputes and critique; and, second, transformations of 
capitalism, especially those taking place between the early 1960s and the late 
1990s. In relation to these research foci, Boltanski has sought to develop a 
‘sociology of critique’, based on empirical fieldwork undertaken in a number 
of domains, such as the media, state policies, management, as well as new 
forms of work and organization. 
In 2008, Boltanski delivered the Adorno Lectures at Frankfurt, which were 
subsequently published as De la critique : Précis de sociologie de l’émancipation 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2009) [English edition: On Critique: A Sociology of 
Emancipation, trans. Gregory Elliott, Cambridge: Polity, 2011]. In 2012, he 
was awarded the Lauréat du 1er prix Pétrarque de l’essai France Culture/Le 
Monde (2012) for his study Énigmes et complots : Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2012) [English edition: Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective 
Stories, Spy Novels and the Making of Modern Societies, trans. Catherine Porter, 
Cambridge: Polity, 2014]. 
As reflected in the themes examined in Énigmes et complots, Boltanski has 
recently embarked upon a critical study of the construction of the modern 
European nation-state, notably in terms of its systemic capacity to reduce  the 
multiple uncertainties permeating social life. One key issue with which he has 
been grappling in this context is the question of the extent to which the 
tension-laden project of the European nation-state has triggered the 
emergence of ‘new forms of representation’ in the humanities and social 
sciences. 
  
 
Major Works and Contributions 
Boltanski has produced a large number of single-authored and co-authored 
books, edited and co-edited volumes, book chapters, and journal articles. In 
addition, he has written and published poetry as well as, more recently, theatre 
plays. For the sake of brevity, the summary provided in this section shall focus 
on his most influential sociological works. 
 
I. 
Les cadres : La formation d’un groupe social (Paris: Minuit, 1982) 
[The Making of a Class: Cadres in French Society, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)]2 
 
As mentioned above, this book  is  based  on  the  thesis  for  which Boltanski 
– under the supervision of Pierre Ansart – was awarded his Doctorat d’État in 
1981. It provides an in-depth study of les cadres  – that  is, of a powerful 
social group made up of business leaders, managers, directors, chiefs, 
supervisors, and executives. One of  the defining features  of this group is that 
it projects the image of a new class, which is neither bourgeois nor proletarian. 
Its members may be described as ‘highly competent’, ‘highly skilled’, ‘highly 
motivated’,  and  –  both  politically  and economically –  ‘highly  influential’.  
Yet,  far  from  portraying  them  as a homogenous cluster of social actors, 
Boltanski stresses their internal diversity. He does so by drawing upon the 
information provided in numerous interviews conducted with representatives 
of this group, enabling him to deconstruct the myth that the emergence of  les  
cadres  can be regarded as   a quasi-natural outcome of social, economic, and 
technological progress. 
With  respect  to  the development of  les cadres, two historical phases are 
particularly important: 
 
• The first stage can be traced back to the 1930s, a period in which members 
of increasingly influential socio-professional groups – such as engineers and 
owners of capital – sought official and institutional recognition. The 
emergence of the Confédération Générale des Syndicats des Classes 
Moyennes can be interpreted as symptomatic of the desire of these privileged 
groups to assert the existence of a link between their organizational structure 
and their social status. 
• The second stage commenced in the post-1945 era, a period in which it 
became evident that French society was divided into three, rather than two, 
main classes: the proletariat, the middle class, and the bourgeoisie.  One of 
  
 
the distinctive ideological features of the middle class, largely associated with 
les cadres, is that most of its representatives endorse political developments 
associated with a Troisième Voie (‘Third Way’), situated between individualism 
and collectivism, capitalism and communism, Manchester liberalism and 
Soviet-style socialism. 
 
Members of les cadres, then, tend to advocate – implicitly or explicitly – the 
ideology of meritocracy. According to this belief system, holders of political, 
economic, institutional, or managerial power can legitimize their prominent 
position in society by reference to ‘progressive’ resources (such as ‘merit’, 
‘competence’, and ‘talent’), rather than ‘regressive’ dogmas (such as ‘heritage’, 
‘tradition’, and ‘custom’). Because of their increasing material and ideological 
influence between the 1950s and the 1970s, the normative agenda of les 
cadres cannot be divorced from postindustrial labels – such as ‘late modernity’, 
‘technology’, ‘productivity’, ‘efficiency’, ‘creativity’, ‘meritocracy’, ‘expertise’, 
and ‘dynamism’ –, which are central to the consolidation of ‘knowledge 
economies’. Considering the alleged triumph of the ‘affluent society’, 
illustrated by the rise of les cadres, it appears that, in the postindustrial era, 
‘class conflict’ and ‘class struggle’ have been replaced by ‘class cooperation’ 
and ‘class compromise’. 
One of Boltanski’s most significant achievements in this study, however, is 
to have demonstrated the immense internal heterogeneity, along with the 
profound structural fragility, characterizing les cadres. His fine-grained analysis 
illustrates that the portrayal of this social group as a uniform and homogenous 
collective force,  as well as its triumphalist celebration as the protagonist of  a 
new meritocratic era based on prosperity and progress, must be rejected   as a 
reductive misrepresentation of what is – in reality – a highly complex, 
heterogeneous, and volatile assemblage of actors. 
Critics may have plausible reservations about the Francocentric – and, 
hence, geographically and socio-politically limited – scope of this enquiry. 
Indeed, the English translation of the original French La formation d’un 
groupe social (The making of a social group) into The Making of a Class 
may – contrary to Boltanski’s intentions – convey the misleading impression 
that les cadres form a social class, rather than a social group. Such an 
assumption seems untenable, given the fragmented and unstable constitution 
of their material and symbolic resources for action, of their internal  
organizational  structure,  and  of  their  members’  trajectories.   In the 
contemporary era, a significant sociological challenge consists in exploring 
the extent to which  les  cadres  continue to  play  a  pivotal role in shaping 
social, economic, political, and ideological developments both in and beyond 
France. 
  
II. 
L’amour et la justice comme compétences : Trois essais de sociologie de l’action (Paris: 
Métailié, 1990) 
[Love  and  Justice  as  Competences,  trans.  Catherine  Porter  (Cambridge:  Polity, 
2012)]3 
 
This book is of crucial importance in that it is one of the first works marking 
Boltanski’s unambiguous rupture with the sociological approach developed 
by his academic mentor, Pierre Bourdieu. To be precise, it is Boltanski’s first 
major single-authored study to make an explicit attempt to challenge the 
arguably scientistic, positivist, and fatalistic presuppositions underpinning 
Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’. In essence, this treatise accomplishes this by 
arguing that people care a great deal about justice. To be exact, Boltanski starts 
from the assumption that ordinary actors engage – enthusiastically and critically – in 
everyday disputes over different – and, in many respects, competing – conceptions of 
justice. It is particularly in situations in which people’s sense of justice is 
challenged, affronted, or disturbed that they are likely to engage in subtle or 
open confrontations with others. Unlike Bourdieu, however, Boltanski posits 
that – instead of acting mainly in strategic, instrumental, utility-driven, or 
calculating ways – subjects capable of reflection and justification are able to engage 
in intersubjectively constituted processes of discourse and argumentation, 
thereby raising claims to validity in relation to different sets of normativity. 
People’s practical construction of, intuitive immersion in, and critical 
engagement with ‘regimes of justice’ can be considered central to the value- 
laden unfolding of social life. No less important, in this respect, is the socio- 
ontological role of what Boltanski refers to as the ‘regime of peace’ and the ‘regime 
of love’ (agapè), whose existence is due to the fact that some actions are selfless 
and gratuitous. What all of these grammatically structured regimes of action – 
between which people, in their everyday lives, move back and forth – have  in 
common is that they require their protagonists to refuse to draw on their 
capacity for violence, which can manifest itself in various – notably, physical, 
symbolic, and structural – forms of power. 
The Boltanskian view that social life, far from being reducible to an interest- 
laden conglomerate of strategically driven actions and vertically structured 
power relations, is shaped by people’s need for love and justice is founded on two 
key ideas: 
 
(1) The idea of a ‘common humanity’, implying that, since human actors are 
members of one and the same species, their lives are comparable in terms 
  
 
of normative codes of ‘equivalence’ from which, in principle, no individual 
can be excluded; 
(2) The idea of ‘orders of worth’, through which equivalences are established 
between individuals, permitting for the collective pursuit of the ‘common 
good’, notwithstanding the multiple – social, political, economic, ideological, 
symbolic, and physical – differences that separate human actors from one 
another. 
 
In short, as members of a ‘common humanity’, we  are  equipped with  the 
normative capacity to establish ‘orders of worth’ in  the  pursuit of  the 
‘common good’, which transcends the divisive logic of competitive 
position-taking and merely strategic performativity. One of the main 
contributions of  Boltanski’s Love  and  Justice  as  Competences, therefore, is to 
have shed light on the moral foundations of society by taking seriously people’s 
ability to engage in the construction of everyday forms of normativity. In other 
words, this book is a powerful reminder that our capacity to mobilize the 
reflexive resources embedded in our critical capacity permits us to build 
meaningful social relations based on a genuine concern with justice, love, 
and reciprocity. 
 
III. 
De la justification : Les économies de la grandeur, avec Laurent Thévenot (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991) 
[On  Justification:  Economies  of  Worth, with Laurent Thévenot, trans. Catherine 
Porter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006)]4 
 
This book grapples with one of the most vital, yet largely underappreciated, 
dimensions of social existence: processes of justification. Integral to the 
construction of all human life forms are the multiple ways in which individuals 
justify, or fail to justify, their actions to others by referring to normative 
principles they consider – contextually or universally – defensible. Yet, not 
only do subjects capable of action, reflection, and justification seek to perceive, 
interpret, understand, and represent the normative parameters by which their lives 
are shaped; in addition, they often misperceive, misinterpret, misunderstand, and 
misrepresent these parameters, especially when failing to realize that different 
situations, constructed by different actors, generate different normative 
criteria and expectations. Indeed, many disagreements and conflicts arise from 
the fact that people appeal – consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or 
unwittingly, implicitly or explicitly – to divergent principles of cognition, 
evaluation, and judgement. 
  
 
This study provides numerous useful insights into the pivotal role that 
processes of justification play in the construction of social life. These can be 
synthesized in terms of the following levels of analysis: 
(1) Ordinary actors are equipped with critical, moral, and judgemental capacities. Owing to 
their ability to participate – actively and reflexively – in the meaning- and value- 
laden construction of different forms of sociality, their claims to objective, 
normative, or subjective validity are irreducible to mere epiphenomena of an 
interest- and power-laden struggle for legitimacy in field-specific – and, hence, 
positionally determined and dispositionally reproduced – realities. 
(2) Any attempt to construct a hierarchy between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘social- 
scientific knowledge’ is epistemologically erroneous, methodologically counterproductive, 
sociologically untenable, politically patronizing, and philosophically fatalistic. To be 
sure, the point is not to deny that there are substantial qualitative differences 
between ‘scientific analysis’ and ‘common sense’. It is crucial, however, to 
concede that these two levels of epistemic engagement with specific 
aspects of reality are not as far apart as they may appear at first glance. 
Instead of undertaking a clear-cut ‘epistemological break’ with the doxic 
illusions of common sense, the challenge consists in exploring the extent 
to which ordinary people’s critical capacity constitutes a precondition for, 
rather than an obstacle to, the possibility of reflection and justification in 
all normatively codified settings of social interaction. 
(3) All activities of justification have both grammatical and processual dimensions, which 
can be empirically studied and conceptually grasped. Given their grammatical 
constitution, activities of justification are structuredbycontext-specific logics 
of rationalization, argumentation, and valorization. Given their processual 
constitution, the underlying objective, normative, or subjective parameters 
mobilized in order to justify a belief or an action are not only in a constant 
state of flux but also contingent upon the changing sets of circumstances 
in which they are applied by those making claims to validity and aiming to 
obtain empowering degrees of legitimacy. Different cités  (polities) may be 
regarded as idiosyncratic mondes (worlds) capable of establishing different 
grandeurs (orders of worth) with different conceptions of bien comun (common 
good), whose validity can be confirmed or undermined by means of 
different épreuves (tests). Irrespective of the spatio-temporal specificity of 
a social situation, there are no practices of meaning- and value-laden 
interaction without both grammars and processes of justification. 
(4) There are multiple normative orders with corresponding regimes of justification and 
modes of evaluation. Six ‘worlds’, with corresponding ‘orders of worth’, are 
particularly important: ‘the inspired world’, ‘the domestic world’, ‘the civic 
world’, ‘the world of opinion and fame’, ‘the world of the market’, and ‘the 
  
 
industrial world’. These ‘worlds’ possess both  a ‘quotidian’ and a ‘metaphysical’ 
dimension. 
 
• Their ‘quotidian’, and thus ‘ordinary’, constitution is reflected in the fact 
that these ‘worlds’ permeate the normative structure of people’s everyday 
practices, as they find themselves immersed in different regimes of action 
and justification when navigating their way through the social universe. 
The experiences of passion (‘inspired’), trust (‘domestic’), solidarity 
(‘civic’), recognition (‘fame’), exchange value (‘market’), and productivity 
(‘industry’) are built into ‘orders of worth’ by means of which actors 
engage with, and attribute meaning to, reality on a day-to-day basis. 
• Their ‘metaphysical’, or simply ‘philosophical’, constitution is expressed in 
the fact that the systematic concern with the ontological significance of 
these ‘worlds’ can be traced back to the writings of classical social and 
political thinkers: St. Augustine (‘the inspired world’), Jacques- 
Bénigne Bossuet (‘the domestic world’), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (‘the 
civic world’), Thomas Hobbes (‘the world of fame’), Adam Smith (‘the 
world of the market’), and Henri de Saint-Simon (‘the industrial world’). 
 
(5) Social actors are obliged to possess a certain degree of realism when engaging in disputes. 
Put  differently,  people’s  participation  in  the  normative  construction  of 
social life is inconceivable without their competence to assess what is 
possible, and what is not possible, when faced with a given set of materially 
and symbolically organized circumstances. People’s capacity to be realistic 
in terms of what they can, and cannot, achieve within particular situations 
is a praxeological precondition for their ability to make judgements  about 
– and, if required, take decisions in relation to – specific issues at stake in 
changing settings of interaction. Just as they are obliged to make 
compromises, they are expected to be able to cope with the fact that overt or 
hidden conflicts form an ineluctable component of social existence. Since, 
in their everyday lives, they are constantly required to position themselves 
in relation to normatively codified forms of action, they cannot escape the 
need to engage in processes of justification. 
 
IV. 
La souffrance à distance : Morale humanitaire, medias et politique (Paris: Métailié, 1993; 
Paris: Gallimard, 2007 [extended version]) 
[Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics, trans. Graham D. Burchell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)]5 
  
 
This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis of ‘distant suffering’ – that 
is, of the experience and effects of perceiving processes of human grief and 
misery ‘from a distance’. Perhaps, the most fundamental sociological issue with 
which Boltanski grapples in this study is the question of how human actors 
react when exposed to spectacles of suffering, whilst being geographically 
remote from the locations in which tragic or catastrophic events occur. Seeking 
to respond to this question, Boltanski unearths various sociological, political, 
moral, psychological, and fictional accounts concerned with the impact of 
‘distant suffering’ upon those who experience it. 
The book comprises three main parts. In Part I, entitled ‘The Question of the 
Spectator’, Boltanski explores the normative issues arising from a set of principles 
and practices to which he refers as ‘the politics of pity’. In Part II, entitled ‘The 
Topics of Suffering’, Boltanski draws on literary sources to examine several 
intermediary elements that influence the spectator’s rational and emotional 
reactions to gruesome media portrayals. In Part III, entitled ‘The Crisis of Pity’, 
Boltanski reflects on the implications of the fact that spectators can be converted 
into moral and political actors, particularly when passing value judgements on the 
alleged facts and happenings to which they are exposed via the media. 
One of the most interesting and tension-laden phenomena examined by 
Boltanski in Distant Suffering can be described as follows: members of affluent 
societies, especially those of ‘the privileged West’, may express different degrees 
of empathy and compassion towards faraway actors whose lives are negatively 
affected by deeply unfortunate circumstances, despite the fact that the former lack 
any kind of direct personal, communal, or societal attachment to the latter. Given 
the rise of highly advanced communication and information technologies, 
epitomized in the increasing influence of the mass media, the advantaged sectors 
of world society tend to consume distant forms of suffering as sensationalistically 
reconstructed spectacles, which are experienced within the comfort zones of 
people’s living rooms and generated within the technological parameters of 
digitally produced hyperrealities. Spectators are moral and political actors to the 
extent that their exposure to distant suffering triggers emotional reactions in 
them, which will require them to make normative judgements about the remote 
occurrences with which they find themselves confronted. 
In practice, it appears that spectators whose perception of reality is 
colonized by mediated images of human misery are faced with a dilemma: 
namely, ‘abstract universalism’ versus ‘local particularism’. The former designates 
people’s capacity to develop a sense of global solidarity with other members of 
a common humanity. The latter describes people’s capacity to develop a sense 
of local solidarity with other members of a specific community. The problem with 
the former position is that it tends to remain too broad, demanding spectators, 
too readily, to identify with all those who experience human suffering. In 
  
 
this case, the danger consists in misperceiving or misrepresenting the sorrow 
of others as one’s own, thereby undervaluing the specificity and potential 
incommensurability of  local  issues.  The  problem  with  the  latter  stance is 
that it tends to remain too narrow, effectively disregarding those who live 
outside their immediate lifeworlds and, furthermore, implying that assistance 
should be offered to those to whom they can refer within the boundaries      of 
a reduced sense of historical, cultural,  or  geographical  proximity.  In  this 
case, the danger consists in overlooking the potentially global scope of locally 
specific developments by limiting oneself to a parochial understanding of 
reality, in which there is little – if any – scope for making sense of the 
increasing interconnectedness between different individual and collective 
forms of agency. 
In the digital age, then, those who have direct and regular access to the mass 
media are habitually exposed to horrific images – such as starving children, 
bombed villages, war, genocide, and mass graves. It is far from clear, however, 
what it means to respond accurately and responsibly to such scenarios. For 
Boltanski, there is no doubt that, in order to overcome a paralysing state of 
sensationalism and voyeurism, spectators must rise above mere feelings of 
empathy and compassion. The ‘politics of pity’ is unsatisfactory in the sense 
that it encourages consumers of mediated misery to focus on the spectacle  of 
suffering, thereby requiring them to observe the unfortunate, rather than to 
scrutinize – let alone to act upon – the socio-historical roots behind their 
deprivation. Boltanski, therefore, urges his readers to imagine possibilities of 
action and thereby challenge the constraining limitations, and detrimental 
consequences, of the largely passive consumption of information. Granted, 
the shift from a potentially disempowering ‘world of representation’ to a 
genuinely empowering ‘world of action’ is complex. Yet, the Boltanskian idea 
of a political and moral sociology cannot be dissociated from the conviction 
that subjects capable of reflection and justification are able  to  mobilize their 
critical resources in order to engage in normatively defensible and 
performatively empowering forms of action. 
 
V. 
Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, avec Ève Chiapello (Paris: Gallimard, 1999) 
[The New Spirit of Capitalism, with Ève Chiapello, trans. Gregory Elliott 
(London: Verso, 2005)]6 
 
This book provides a cutting-edge analysis of the emergence of what Boltanski 
and Chiapello describe as the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ in the late twentieth 
century. Shortly after its original publication in 1999, this study became a 
  
 
bestseller in France.  There  are  several  reasons  why The New Spirit of Capitalism 
can be considered a major contribution to contemporary sociology: 
 
(1) It offers a comprehensive account of the transformation of capitalist modes of 
organization in Western Europe, notably in France, since the 1960s. Its 
empirically informed and conceptually sophisticated examination is 
indicative of a timely understanding of fundamental economic, political, 
cultural, demographic, and ideological changes that have led to the gradual 
consolidation of a ‘new spirit’ permeating capitalism in recent decades. 
(2) It contains a persuasive proposal to revise Max Weber’s conception of ‘the 
spirit of capitalism’, based on substantial evidence confirming the 
emergence of new mechanisms of legitimization. The discourses created in order 
to reinforce the legitimacy of capitalist social orders have fundamentally 
changed in the late twentieth century, celebrating vital neo-managerial 
ideals – such as ‘flexibility’, ‘adaptability’, ‘creativity’, and ‘mobility’ – and 
thereby converting capitalism into an ever-more elastic, and seemingly 
forward-looking, system of economic organization. 
(3) It illustrates the theoretical contributions and intellectual merits of 
Boltanski’s sociological framework in that it sheds light on the role of critical 
capacity in bringing about socio-political change and shaping the direction 
of large-scale socio-historical developments. 
(4) It forms an integral part of Boltanski’s attempt to develop a ‘pragmatic sociology 
of critique’, aimed at taking ordinary actors seriously, notably in terms of their 
readiness to engage in disputes concerning issues of justice. For Boltanski and 
Chiapello, processes of justification are irreducible to an ideological smokescreen, 
since they exert discursively negotiated constraints upon systems of domination, 
thereby potentially undermining processes of alienation, exploitation, and 
discrimination. On this account, public spheres constitute discursive realms 
shaped by open debates between different ‘orders of value’, and by a ceaseless 
undertaking of ‘tests’ (épreuves), which either confirm or undermine the 
legitimacy of a given set of normative arrangements and practices. 
 
According to Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis, we can distinguish three ‘spirits’ 
of capitalism: 
 
• The first spirit, prevalent in early modern societies, can be characterized as 
‘family capitalism’, in the sense that it prioritizes the individual figure of the 
bourgeois proprietor and finds its ideological justification, above all, in the 
‘domestic city’. It is intimately interrelated with the productive ethos of 
Weber’s famous Protestant Ethic. Sweeping away the rigid social, political, 
and economic structures of  feudal-absolutist formations, the constitutive 
  
 
component of the ‘first spirit of capitalism’ is productivism. 
• The second spirit can be referred to as ‘industrial or organizational capitalism’, 
epitomized in the protagonist role of ‘the manager’, whose societal function 
is associated with ‘organization man’. Emerging in response to the crisis of 
1929–30, it is composed of a combination of Fordist industrialism and Keynesian 
interventionism, which may be interpreted as a trade-off between Rousseau’s 
‘civic city’ and Saint-Simon’s ‘industrial city’. The societal constellation 
generated by this historic settlement had two major consequences: (a) it 
contributed to enhancing the acquisitive power of the working classes in 
particular and people’s chances to benefit from upward social mobility in 
general; (b) it contributed to the rise of a relatively autonomous salaried 
professional labour force, especially in the liberal professions, arts and 
sciences, and public sector. 
• The third spirit manifests itself, most clearly, in the ‘city of projects’, in which 
market-driven principles – such as ‘flexibility’, ‘adaptability’, ‘creativity’, 
and ‘mobility’ – play a pivotal role in developing an ever-more elastic, and 
seemingly forward-looking, capitalist system. Also described as the ‘new spirit 
of capitalism’, it is inextricably linked to the rise of neo-liberalism and neo- 
managerialism, especially from the 1970s onwards, indicating the restoration 
of large-scale market discipline along with a shift towards the increasing 
financialization of capital flows. One of the paradoxical achievements of this 
‘new spirit’ is to have succeeded in appropriating the subversive forces that 
sought to undermine the legitimacy of capitalism for its own purposes. The 
elastic and flexible nature of this ‘new spirit’ emanates from capitalism’s 
capacity to promote and integrate discursive processes of debate and 
critique, thereby ensuring that, as a politico-economic system, it is both 
structurally and ideologically highly adaptable. The idea of ‘dominating by 
change’ is essential to contemporary forms of social domination. 
 
The neo-managerialist ideology permeating the ‘third spirit of capitalism’ has 
proved able to incorporate the social and artistic critiques that thrived in May 
1968, whilst large parts of the political radicals belonging to the 1968 
generation – notably the soixante-huitards in France and the Achtundsechziger in 
Germany – have themselves, more or less actively and wittingly, joined the 
European establishment. Whatever one makes of their legacy, it is hard  to 
deny that the increasing influence of flexible global networks – created and 
sustained by actors working cooperatively on multiple projects – as well as 
the notion of personal empowerment at the workplace – expressed in the gradual 
relegation of bureaucratic, hierarchical, and top-down organizations to an 
obsolete past – reflect a profound shift in capitalist culture, which has been 
taking place in most Western countries from the 1960s onwards. 
  
 
Yet, the rise of  the ‘network  man’  illustrates not only the emergence of  a 
new systemic and ideological modus operandi of capitalism, but also its new 
spirit’s capacity to take seriously four sources of indignation: inauthenticity, oppression, 
misery and inequality, and egoism. The former two were central objects of different 
versions of artistic critique; the latter two were principal matters of concern under 
the umbrella of social critique. It is one of Boltanski and Chiapello’s noteworthy 
achievements to have demonstrated, with considerable empirical evidence and 
conceptual precision, that most contemporary forms of capitalism possess the 
capacity to incorporate normative processes based on critical discourse into their 
mode of functioning. In this sense, categorical openness to debate, controversy, 
and constant reassessment has been converted into one of the normative 
cornerstones underlying the ‘new spirit of capitalism’. 
 
VI. 
La condition fœtale : Une sociologie de l’engendrement et de l’avortement (Paris: Gallimard, 
2004) 
[The Foetal Condition: A Sociology of Engendering and Abortion, trans. Catherine 
Porter (Cambridge: Polity, 2013)]7 
 
Undoubtedly, this is one of Boltanski’s most controversial books – possibly, 
because it deals with one of the most contentious issues in contemporary society: 
abortion. Given that this topic has hardly been scrutinized with sufficient rigour 
in the social sciences, this treatise may be regarded as one of Boltanski’s greatest 
contributions to sociology. Debates concerning the moral and political questions 
arising from abortion form an integral component of public spheres in liberal 
societies. Despite the increasing openness about this subject in most pluralistic 
cultures, abortion remains not only a source of controversy but also a sensitive 
issue, whose normative implications cannot be reduced to an ideological division 
between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’, ‘regressive’ and ‘progressive’, ‘conservative’ and 
‘liberal’, or ‘traditionalist’ and ‘open-minded’ citizens. 
In this study, Boltanski draws upon accounts and statements collected from 
hospital settings as well as upon in-depth interviews conducted with women who 
have undergone abortions. In his insightful socio-philosophical interpretation 
of the discursive data upon which this enquiry is based, he directs his readers’ 
attention to the profound ambivalence that appears to be built into abortion as a 
social practice. To be precise, for Boltanski, abortion exposes a contradiction 
that is inherent in all human life forms: on the one hand, we assume that 
individual human beings are unique and distinctive; on the other hand, we are 
confronted with their replaceable and disposable nature, without which there 
would be no demographic renewal and no societal regeneration. 
  
 
Boltanski, therefore, proposes to examine the ways in which human beings 
are engendered by dissecting the symbolically mediated controls and 
constraints that are imposed upon them by society, of which they can become 
fully fledged members only to the extent that they are both willing and able to 
share its – normatively charged – conception of species-constitutive existence. 
On this view, a foetus is not a human being ‘in itself ’, ensconced within the 
female body, but rather a human being ‘for itself ’, to the degree that it is 
symbolically constructed and discursively considered as such by the members of a given 
society. For Boltanski, one twofold categorization is particularly important in 
this regard: the ‘project foetus’ and the ‘tumoral foetus’. The former is desired by 
its parents, who attribute positive characteristics – such as ‘meaningfulness’, 
‘fulfilment’, ‘love’, and ‘life plans’ – to its existence. The latter is deprived of 
the privilege of  forming an integral element of  a parental endeavour and,   in 
extreme-case scenarios, may be reducible to a nameless, replaceable, and 
undesired form of being, whose non-existence is preferred to its existence by 
those who have the power to decide over its future. 
In the human world, then, sexual reproduction is never simply a biological 
affair but always also a process of social construction, especially in terms of 
how it is both interpreted and regulated by members of particular cultural life 
forms. Boltanski demonstrates, in a neo-Durkheimian fashion, that every social 
order constitutes a moral order – that is, a set of interrelated practices performed 
by ethically responsible actors whose decisions, irrespective of whether these 
are made consciously and unconsciously, have normative implications both 
for those who undertake them and for those who are, directly or indirectly, 
affected by them. Whatever one makes of  Boltanski’s analysis, owing to  the 
contentious nature of this subject, The Foetal Condition cannot fail to 
challenge – and, in some cases, irritate – those contributing to contemporary 
controversies concerning abortion. 
 
VII. 
De la critique : Précis de sociologie de l’émancipation (Paris: Gallimard, 2009) 
[On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation, trans. Gregory Elliott (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2011)]8 
 
Arguably, On Critique is Boltanski’s most philosophical book. It provides an 
in-depth analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of the ‘pragmatic sociology 
of critique’, focusing on the following six key dimensions. 
(1) Boltanski reflects on the task of critical theories. One of their vital concerns 
is the sustained effort to scrutinize the causes,  symptoms,  and consequences of 
power relations  within particular historical contexts,  especially those that are 
  
 
entrenched in societal systems of domination. In this respect, a fundamental 
difference between Bourdieu and Boltanski becomes evident. According to the 
former, ordinary people are largely unconscious of the workings, and essentially 
naïve about the implications, of power relations. According to the latter, ordinary 
people are not only conscious of, and realistic about, power relations but also able 
to problematize the tangible implications of  their existence.  For  Bourdieu, it  is 
the task of ‘critical sociologists’ to uncover the underlying mechanisms that 
determine the asymmetrical structures permeating the interest-laden practices of 
strategic agents, who compete for material and symbolic resources. For Boltanski, by 
contrast, it is the mission of ‘sociologists of critique’ to recognize that human 
beings are moral and reflexive actors, whose critical capacity permits them to 
assess – and, if necessary, justify – the normative validity of their performances. 
(2) Boltanski aims to reconcile Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ with his own ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’. Thus, he seeks to combine and cross-fertilize two seemingly 
antagonistic approaches. The former appears to advocate social determinism and 
positivist scientism, favouring the epistemic capacities of scientists over those of 
everyday actors, who seem to be deluded by doxic preconceptions based on 
common sense. The latter appears to endorse social pragmatism and interpretivist 
normativism, proposing to take ordinary people seriously in terms of both their 
performative capacity to shape the world and their discursive capacity to 
provide reasonable justifications for their beliefs and actions. Rather than 
conceiving of these two sociological approaches as diametrically opposed and 
irreconcilable, Boltanski aims to demonstrate that useful insights can be 
gained not only from comparing and contrasting, but also from combining and 
integrating, these two paradigmatic frameworks. 
(3) Boltanski grapples with the principal functions of social institutions. Their 
most essential task, it seems, consists in producing solidified – or, at least, 
seemingly solidified – realms of social interaction, enabling humans to cope 
with the uncertainty inherent in all worldly life forms. According to Boltanski, 
three analytical distinctions are particularly important for the sociological 
study of institutions: (a) the epistemological distinction between ‘exteriority’ 
and ‘interiority’, (b) the methodological distinction between ‘explanation’ and 
‘justification’, and (c) the socio-ontological distinction between ‘distance-taking’ and 
‘immersion’. Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ tends to focus on the investigative 
levels of exteriority, explanation, and distance-taking. Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’, on the other hand, tends to place the emphasis on the 
explorative levels of interiority, justification, and immersion. Bourdieusians aim to 
scrutinize the functional logic of institutions ‘from without’ – that is, from the 
external viewpoint of objective and objectifying social scientists. Conversely, 
Boltanskians seek to study institutional realities ‘from within’ – that is, from the 
perspective of bodily equipped and spatio-temporally situated social actors. 
  
 
In a more fundamental sense, Boltanski suggests that ‘the institutional’ and 
‘the social’ represent two interdependent – if not equivalent  –  aspects of 
reality. One of the key features distinguishing ‘social facts’ from ‘natural facts’ 
is that they are not simply ‘given’ but always ‘instituted’ – that is, fabricated 
on the basis of habitualized and habitualizing human practices. In this respect, 
Boltanski draws an important distinction between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ 
(réalité). Whereas the former encompasses ‘everything that is the case’, the 
latter comprises ‘everything that is constructed’. Put differently, the world is 
‘everything that happens to people’, whilst reality is ‘everything that is 
constructed by people’. 
To the extent that institutions convert our  encounter  with  the  world  into 
an experience founded on the illusion of relative certainty, they can be 
regarded as a conditio sine qua non of the material and symbolic construction 
of reality. Institutions, therefore, constitute ‘bodiless beings’ that fulfil the task 
of defining what Boltanski calls ‘the whatness of what is’ or, to be exact, ‘the 
whatness of what appears to be’. Due to their symbolic power, institutions have 
the interpretive capacity to determine the semantic resources mobilized by 
members of society when attributing meaning to reality. Due to their material 
power, institutions have the regulative capacity to set the parameters for 
performative operations embedded in specific grammars of interaction. It is 
owing to the existential centrality of this double function that institutions can 
be conceived of as a socio-ontological precondition for the construction of 
human life forms. 
(4) Boltanski examines the role of critique in the normative consolidation 
of social life. Critique constitutes a driving force of historical change: it 
permits both individual and collective actors to shape the development of 
society in accordance with their discursively articulated search for principles 
that are defensible in terms of their practical worth and normative validity. For 
Boltanski, two registers of action are crucial in this respect. On the one hand, 
the ‘practical register’ is characterized by relatively weak and rudimentary levels 
of reflexivity, presupposing a considerable tolerance for differences and 
discrepancies, as well as sustaining a set of codified arrangements that 
guarantee the reproduction of society. On the other hand, the ‘metapragmatic 
register’ is marked by rather elevated and differentiated levels of reflexivity, involving an 
implicit or explicit reference to the normative force of  critique and, at  the 
same time, allowing for the articulation of two metapragmatic forces: 
confirmation and justification. People’s ability to confirm and justify the legitimacy 
of their actions is central to their capacity to participate in the construction of 
normatively regulated constellations. 
Confronted with ‘hermeneutic contradictions’ emanating from the potential 
discrepancies  between  ‘world’  and  ‘reality’ –  that is, between ‘everything 
  
 
that is the case’ and ‘everything that is constructed’ –, human actors, insofar 
as they are equipped with a critical competence, are in a position to question 
the apparent givenness of objectivity by facing up to the genuine arbitrariness 
of all forms of normativity. Illustrating the ‘pragmatic’ dimension of 
Boltanski’s framework, it is crucial to recognize that processes of critique 
cannot be dissociated from three types of ‘test’ (épreuve) undertaken either to 
reinforce or to undermine the legitimacy of a specific ensemble of social 
constellations: (a) ‘truth tests’ (épreuves de vérité) are symbolic in the sense that 
they are supposed to assess the validity of signs and interpretations; (b) ‘reality 
tests’ (épreuves de réalité) are material in the sense that they are meant to evaluate 
the acceptability of bodily performances and actions; (c) ‘existential tests’ 
(épreuves existentielles) are experienced in the sense that they are intended to 
expose the spatio-temporal contingency permeating all forms of lived reality. 
From a Boltanskian perspective, the emancipatory transformation of society 
is inconceivable without a critical engagement with the normative constitution 
of reality. 
(5) Boltanski discusses the concept of domination. More specifically, he draws 
a distinction between two fundamental types of domination: ‘simple domination’ 
or ‘primitive domination’, on the one hand, and ‘complex domination’ or ‘managerial 
domination’, on the other. 
‘Simple’ forms of domination are monolithic in the sense that, under their 
authority, control over a particular population is monopolized by a state or 
overarching institution. Here, people are deprived of fundamental liberties 
(such as freedom of speech, expression, and communication) as well as of 
basic rights (such as civil, political, social, economic, and human rights). 
Under regimes of ‘simple domination’, the exercise of power is relatively 
arbitrary and unambiguously asymmetrical. Obvious historical examples of this 
type of domination include absolutism, fascism, and any kind of dictatorial 
government whose exercise of power is motivated by normative principles 
based on political authoritarianism. 
‘Complex’ forms of domination are polycentric – or, in a more radical sense, even 
centreless – in the sense that, under their influence, power structures are circular, 
amorphous, volatile, and in a constant state of flux, lacking an institutional or 
ideological epicentre. Here, people’s essential liberties and rights are not only 
largely respected, or even defended, but also instrumentalized in order to 
foster the legitimacy of the hegemonic political and economic system in place. 
Under regimes of ‘complex domination’, the exercise of power is – at least in 
principle – democratic and – albeit, admittedly, to varying degrees – 
criticizable. Contemporary scenarios that can be described in these terms  are 
democratic-capitalist societies, shaped by cultures and institutions based on 
political pluralism and, hence, by the fact that critique is incorporated into the 
  
 
routines of everyday life. For Boltanski, then, the emergence of the ‘new spirit 
of capitalism’ is inextricably linked to the possibility of ‘dominating by change’, 
which is based on categorical openness to criticism and, thus, on the capacity 
to obtain legitimacy by advocating the aforementioned neo-managerial ideals, 
such as ‘flexibility’, ‘adaptability’, ‘creativity’, and ‘mobility’. 
(6) Boltanski expresses his own view of the conditions underlying processes 
of human emancipation. In his eyes, these processes are based on individual 
or collective practices that promote the critical project of a reduction in the material 
and symbolic privileges of dominant social groups and thereby contribute to a more 
balanced distribution of capacities for action. On this account, emancipatory 
practices designate purposive processes oriented towards individual or 
collective empowerment, based on its protagonists’ belonging to and 
identification with a common humanity, which is irreducible to the limited 
scope of group-specific stakes and interests. From a Boltanskian perspective, 
there are no emancipatory life forms without open processes of dispute and 
justification – that is, without criticism. One of the key socio-ontological 
functions of criticism is to foster experimentation with human practices in 
which the risk of disempowerment – based on implicit or explicit mechanisms 
of segregation, exclusion, and discrimination – is minimized, whilst the 
possibility of empowerment – emanating from individual and collective processes 
of integration, inclusion, and self-realization – is maximized. To be sure, 
Boltanski does not propose a utopian blueprint envisaging the construction of 
a perfect society. Owing to the anthropological optimism that undergirds his 
writings, however, he dares to believe that the construction of a world based 
on emancipatory life forms is both desirable and possible. Such a world would 
not be determined by constraining sources of  social  domination, such as 
privilege, status, and authority. Rather,  it would be shaped, above  all, by 
people’s purposive, cooperative, and creative capacities that allow for 
individual and collective experiences of self-realization. 
 
VIII. 
Énigmes et complots : Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes (Paris: Gallimard, 2012) 
[Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective Stories, Spy Novels and the Making of Modern 
Societies, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Polity, 2014)]9 
 
In this book, Boltanski draws an analogy between two domains of modern 
writing, which, at first glance, do not appear to have anything significant in 
common: on the one hand, the development of two literary genres, namely detective 
stories, which are based on methodical enquiries, as well as spy novels, which 
are built around plots and conspiracies; on the other hand, the development 
  
 
of the human and social sciences, which are founded not only on systematic 
investigations but also on what may be described as the ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’. Particularly important, in this regard, are the following three 
scientific disciplines: psychiatry, known for fabricating seemingly evidence- 
based conceptions of paranoia; sociology, inspired by the enlightening mission 
to uncover the underlying causal forces that determine both the constitution 
and the evolution of the social world; and political science, seeking to explain the 
origins of major historical events by reference to conspiracy theories. 
Thus, what detective stories and spy novels have in common with the human and 
social sciences is not only the fact that they emerged – and underwent profound 
paradigmatic transitions – in the same historical context – that is, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; what they share, in addition, is the fact 
that they are driven by the ambition to shed light on the mysteries and conspiracies 
whose existence escapes people’s ordinary perception of reality. Hence, they 
seek to call taken-for-granted assumptions about the world into question, by 
providing logically coherent accounts, and evidence-based explanations, of the 
multiple factors influencing different patterns of human action. 
According to Boltanski, the most powerful institutional expression of   the 
attempt to organize and unify reality by regulating and controlling the 
behaviour of a population living within a given territory is the modern nation- 
state. Central to his socio-historical analysis in this book is the assumption 
that, in the modern age, speculations and suspicions about conspiracies became 
a motivational driving force behind both popular and academic conceptions 
of the exercise of power. Inevitably, the search for hidden sources of influence 
involved the ideological construction of a dichotomously constituted reality: 
on the one hand, an official reality, based on appearances, public performances, 
and superficial impressions; on the other hand, an unofficial reality, founded on 
underlying structures, hidden causal mechanisms, and concealed social forces. 
What crime and spy fiction have in common with positivist conceptions of 
science, then, is that they presuppose a discrepancy between these two levels of 
reality: ‘appearance’ versus ‘substance’, ‘interpretation’ versus ‘explanation’, 
‘imagination’ versus ‘observation’, ‘fiction’ versus ‘authenticity’. 
By putting the works of major detective and spy novelists – such as G. K. 
Chesterton, Arthur Conan Doyle, John le Carré, and Graham Greene – under 
sociological scrutiny, Boltanski demonstrates that their writings reveal 
fundamental features not only of fiction-based genre, but also of modern 
society, especially with respect to the reciprocal relationship between modern 
institutions and modern science. According to Boltanski, the nation-state’s 
ambition to exercise unlimited control  over  the reality constructed within the 
boundaries of its territory is aimed at the stabilization of volatile sets of social 
relations.  The binary distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’, which 
  
 
undergirds this socio-political project of the state, is as central to detective and 
spy novels as it is to the functionalist spirit permeating the works of the founding 
figures of sociology – that is, the writings of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and 
Max Weber. 
There are significant differences between national traditions of fiction- 
based genres. In this book, Boltanski focuses on two emblematic representatives 
of detective novels: one English, Sherlock Holmes, and the other one French, 
Jules Maigret. 
 
• Within the English tradition of Sherlock Holmes, the detective represents an 
exceptionally perceptive and skilled actor with the moral capacity to distinguish 
between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, as well as with the performative capacity to move 
back and forth between his ‘public’ and his ‘private’ persona. It is due to his or 
her highly developed moral and performative competences that the detective is 
not only able to put himself or herself in the skin of the criminal but also 
authorized to represent the order of the state: ‘The detective is the State in the 
state of exception.’ 
• Within the French  tradition of  Jules  Maigret, the detective  is embodied  in 
the apolitical figure of the civil servant (fonctionnaire). According to this 
conception, civil servants do not simply represent the state, but they are  the 
state. It is because of their procedural function that they, as part of the 
administrative powers of the state apparatus, can claim to be neutral and 
impartial. Jules Maigret is both an ordinary citizen and a civil servant, whose 
competences are comparable to those of the sociologist: on the one hand, he 
is equipped with a basic social competence, which permits him to relate to 
other citizens as ‘one of  them’; on the other hand, he is equipped with  a 
special reflexive competence, which enables him to conduct investigations 
and distance himself from common-sense assumptions about reality. Since 
he is an ordinary human being with basic social skills, the detective has an 
indigenous understanding of people’s everyday interactions. At the same 
time, because he is equipped with the conceptual and methodological tools 
of the inquisitive expert, the detective has the capacity to distance himself 
from his object of study. 
 
Boltanski emphasizes that detective stories and spy novels are fundamentally 
different in the following sense: within the former, the state tends to be 
portrayed as essentially ‘apolitical’; within the latter, the state tends to be 
conceived of as deeply ‘political’ or even as a ‘war state’. Given the profound 
uncertainty  permeating  capitalist   societies,   which   are   characterized   by 
processes of constant and rapid technological and demographic 
transformation, spy novels and the social sciences serve a complementary 
  
 
function: in the early modern era, the widespread diffusion of the term 
‘paranoia’ is inextricably linked to the paradigms of ‘conspiracy’ and 
‘suspicion’, which inform the exploratory spirit pervading both spy novels and 
positivistically inspired social science – especially psychiatry, sociology, and 
political science. Boltanski has illustrated – with great skill and considerable 
eloquence – that the ‘hermeneutics of investigation’, which one encounters in 
detective stories, and the ‘hermeneutics of conspiracy’, which is central to most 
spy novels, contain significant historical and presuppositional similarities 
with the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, which lies at the heart of the founding 
disciplines of the human and social sciences. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the wide-ranging scope and scholarly originality of Boltanski’s writings,10 
it may hardly be surprising that he is generally regarded as one of the most 
prominent contemporary French sociologists. In fact, his considerable influence 
manifests itself in the emergence of an extensive secondary literature concerned 
with the multifaceted aspects of his oeuvre. His influence spans far beyond 
Francophone11 spheres of social and political thought. Indeed, his international 
impact on current academic debates is reflected, particularly, in recent and 
ongoing Germanophone12 and Anglophone13 controversies concerned with 
both the empirical and the conceptual significance of his various contributions 
to the humanities and social sciences. Whilst it would be erroneous to reduce 
Boltanski’s project to a mere – albeit sophisticated – response to the work of 
his academic patron, Bourdieu, there is no doubt that his proposed paradigm 
shift from ‘critical sociology’ to a ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ has opened 
hitherto unexplored intellectual avenues in the attempt to do justice to the 
pivotal role that critical capacity plays not only in the pursuit of sociology but 
also, more fundamentally, in the daily construction of society. 
 
Notes 
1 An abridged version of this chapter will be published as Simon Susen (2014) ‘Luc 
Boltanski’, in James D. Wright (ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral 
Sciences (2nd Edition, Oxford: Elsevier). 
2 Boltanski (1982). See also Boltanski (1987 [1982]). 
3 Boltanski (1990a). See also Boltanski (2012 [1990]). 
4 Boltanski and Thévenot (1991). See also Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]). 
5 Boltanski (1993). See also Boltanski (1999 [1993]). 
6 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). See also Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]). 
7 Boltanski (2004). See also Boltanski (2013 [2004]). 
8 Boltanski (2009a). See also Boltanski (2011 [2009]). 
9 Boltanski (2012). See also Boltanski (2014 [2012]). 
  
 
10 Other important publications by him include the following: Boltanski (1966); Boltanski 
(1969a); Boltanski (1969b); Boltanski (1970); Boltanski (1973a); Boltanski (1973b); 
Boltanski (1975); Boltanski (1990b); Boltanski (1998); Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski 
(2002); Boltanski (2006); Boltanski (2008c); Boltanski (2009b); Boltanski, Darré, and 
Schiltz (1984); Boltanski and Honneth (2009); Boltanski and Maldidier (1970); Boltanski, 
Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski and Thévenot (1983); Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1999); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975a); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975b); Bourdieu and 
Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]); Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, 
and Chamboredon (1965); Bourdieu, Boltanski, and de Saint Martin (1973); Gadrey, 
Hatchuel, Boltanski, and Chiapello (2001). Two examples of his non-academic writings 
are Boltanski (2008a) and Boltanski (2008b). 
11 See, for example: Bénatouïl (1999a); Berten (1993); Bidet (2002); Caillé (1988); Corcuff 
(1996); Corcuff (1998); Corcuff (2000); de Blic (2000); de Blic and Mouchard (2000a); 
de Blic and Mouchard (2000b); Dodier (1991); Dodier (1993); Gadrey, Hatchuel, 
Boltanski, and Chiapello (2001); Gautier (2001); Nachi (2006); Negri (1994); Stavo- 
Debauge (2011); Susen (2012); Thévenot (1990); Thévenot (1998); Thévenot (2006). 
12 See, for example: Basaure, Reemtsma, and Willig (2009); Bogusz (2010); Boltanski and 
Honneth (2009); Celikates (2009), esp. 136–157; Dörre, Lessenich, and Rosa (2009); 
Forst, Hartmann, Jaeggi, and Saar (2009); Hartmann (2009), esp. 526–527; Jaeggi 
(2009); Jaeggi and Wesche (2009), esp. 14–15; Rehberg (2007); Schmidt (2007). 
13 See, for example: Baert and Silva (2010 [1998]), 42–48; Basaure (2011); Bénatouïl 
(1999b); Blokker (2011); Blokker and Brighenti (2011); Borghi (2011); Callinicos (2006), 
esp. 5, 15, 51–72, and 155–156; Chiapello and Fairclough (2002); Delanty (2011); 
Eulriet (2008); Fabiani (2011); Frère (2004), esp. 92–93 and 97n.4; Honneth (2010); 
Jagd (2011); Silber (2003); Silber (2011); Stark (2009); Susen (2007), esp. 7, 146n.8, 
147n.31, 167n.5, 202n.89, 202n.93, 223–224, 227n.25, 228n.50, 229n.51, 229n.52, 
271n.24, 319, 322, and 325; Susen (2011a), esp. 447–450, 453–456, and 459–461; 
Susen (2011b), esp. 370; Turner (2007); Wagner (1994); Wagner (1999); Wagner (2010). 
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